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In recent years there has been a rich flow of scholarly works on the “waning of the 
West’s primacy”, and the books reviewed in this essay are no exception. They contribute 
to ongoing debate between the “declinists” and those who believe in the durability and 
adaptability of the present Western order in the time of transition of power. The debate 
has been largely focusing on the decline of the U.S. power relative to the “rising rest” and 
its implications on the international system. Previous studies have largely focused on the 
logic of power in world politics and whether power transition can bring about war or 
peace. On the other hand, there are scholars who argue that the current transition of 
power from the West to the East is part of a longer historical pattern (cf. Tammen 2008). 
To them, this coming change in the shape of a Post-American World is something that 
can be managed and embraced, without employing a Realist logic which perceives such 
course of developments as a threat to the only viable conception of international order (cf. 
Mearsheimer 2001, Zakaria 2008). 
At least two positions can be identified in this debate. The first one posits that the change 
in global power distribution may affect the functioning of international institutions 
and challenge the accepted norms due to the change in the understanding of what the 
underlying values of the international society are. One could ask how the post-Western 
order may be different from the one that has been present since the 1500s. The argument 
is that there are new ways of providing political and economic legitimization of the polities 
which are different from the Western liberal model (e.g. the so-called Beijing consensus). 
The second position argues that a change in the global distribution of power may not 
undermine the Western system because the success of the capitalist way of production 
and democratic governance is still very vital and provides benefits for the developing 
countries whose elites are socialized into the liberal international order. This may likely 
bring about a gradual transformation of the present system to include new members, 
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which is flexible enough to accommodate their differences without changing the key 
properties.
The debate about the future of international order is important for the study of international 
security. For example, Barry Buzan (2011) writes that the concept of superpower cannot 
be reasonably applied to the present situation in the 21st century, and that the world 
politics is going to be marked by “decentered globalism”. This is the world in which “there 
will be no superpowers, only great powers”. In his analysis of the international system, 
Buzan uses material and social factors to explain why the United States will not remain a 
superpower, whereas China and the EU will not become superpowers at all. He then goes 
on to look at why “a world with only great powers is likely to take a more regionalized 
form” and what the downsides of regional hegemony are (Buzan 2011, 3). The debate 
about power distribution in the international system and the next world order is linked to 
the debate about levels of analysis within IR and Security Studies. In the past two decades, 
considerable attention was paid to the levels of analysis, where the regional level has been 
particularly theorized in the works of Barry Buzan and his associates. By developing 
Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), a more balanced, non-great power centered 
analytical framework for international security dynamics was developed (see Buzan et al. 
1998, Buzan and Waever 2003). The books by Charles Kupchan and Kishore Mahbubani 
reviewed in this essay present a timely contribution to the above-mentioned debate. The 
purpose of this essay, however, is more than just to review them. I argue that the study of 
regional security can benefit from insights into the power transition that is taking place at 
the global level, especially in the part dealing with security community development and 
regional security governance. 
Both books cover the issue of ‘power transition in world politics’, although from different 
perspectives. Their “birds’ view” perspective of international system can help us draw 
some conclusions for the study of regional security at the beginning of this century and the 
coming decades. My focus in this essay is on the regional level of analysis. To understand 
regional security, I use RSCT which is based on two premises: states are still dominant 
referent objects of security, and security threats travel more easily over short distance 
(Buzan et al. 1998). It is for this reason that security dynamics is more comprehensively 
analyzed at a regional level, because “the shared process of constructing security concerns 
and methods for dealing with them amongst member states, points toward a functioning 
system that can be systematically identified”, as opposed to the global level (Frazier and 
Stewart-Ingersoll 2010, 733). Security complexes are, basically, security regions that 
encompass distinctive security dynamics (among and within their units) that is relatively 
independent from the influence of extra-regional actors. How do, then, the ideas from the 
two books reviewed in this essay relate to RSCT? 
While Kupchan argues that the world will be dominated by no single superpower in a 
regionalized world, Mahbubani asserts that the East will find its place in what is going to 
be “One World”. With regards to that, my reading of these books is focusing on identifying 
the elements which are relevant for understanding how regional orders are situated within 
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a broader international order. Moreover, I aim to stress how those resulting regional 
hegemonies would impact the intra-regional and trans-regional security dynamics. The 
former is best explained by the measure of conflictual security dynamics among the states 
(conflict formation, security regime, security community). Trans-regional dynamics on 
the other hand can be best explained as a relationship between the particular regions, 
or their great powers which can either penetrate or overlay other regional security 
complexes or sub-complexes. The idea of decreasing or increasing the conflictual 
potential of security dynamics is reflected in the concepts of security regimes and security 
communities, and the question I wish to answer in this review article is this: How the 
change in global distribution of power and transformation of international order in the 
21st century can affect the prospects for both inter-regional and intra-regional security? 
By drawing on the argument made by Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll (2010, 735) that 
capability is not the only factor that determines regional security orders1 I claim that the 
change in global power distribution may not single-handedly determine the course and 
patterns of regional security orders and dynamics of intra-regional security. Therefore, 
regional powers or great powers may show different attitudes which are not necessarily 
determined by structural conditions. 
Alternatives to the Western Order and Western Managing of the Global Turn
A professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University, Charles Kupchan has 
been writing extensively on the effects of change in power distribution on the US-led 
international order. In No One’s World, he defines the international environment as such 
where “power is diversifying, not one in which all countries are converging toward the 
Western way” (p. 3). Although he recognizes that Asia will likely “assume the mantle 
of leadership” in this century, it cannot be said that “any country, region or model will 
dominate the next world”. It is important to note that Kupchan’s vision of the international 
system includes “numerous power centers” and “multiple versions of modernity” (p. 3). 
The approach Kupchan takes in this book is long durée, that is, his reliance on “deeper 
historical forces and patterns”, which led him to examine the 500 years of Western march 
towards capitalism and democracy, as systemic factors that shape state behavior. The goal 
of this book is to explore the causes and consequences of the global turn, and to counsel 
the West how best to minimize the consequences of the decreasing hegemony (pp. 10−11).
The book is organized in seven chapters. Chapter 1: The Turn defines the goals of the 
book (historical analysis of the Western success and prescriptions for the 21st century US 
policy). Chapters 2 and 3 explain how Europe became a developed and prosperous region 
during the period 1500−1800 due to the lack of centralized social and political order (as 
opposed to Japan, India, China and the Ottoman Empire). He indirectly evokes the idea of 
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regional security complexes, citing Bull and Watson who write that “contacts among these 
regional international systems were much more limited than contacts within them” (p. 
64). Chapters 4 and 5 explain that the rise of the East represents a response to a decreasing 
appeal of liberal models of governance at the onset of the 21st century leading to the rising 
attraction of alternative forms of political and economic organization (“more state control 
is often an advantage in coping with a fast, interdependent and porous world”, p. 89). 
Chapters 6 and 7 point to internal problems of the Western countries, renationalization of 
politics and the lack of global leadership at the time when the West “must seek to emerge 
from its doldrums and help manage that turn” (p. 166). Kupchan takes a normative stand 
in arguing that the West must restore “centrism and pragmatism” because globalization 
is weakening a state. The solution he proposes concerns the global level and considerable 
changes in US elite discourse which shall “begin laying groundwork for a more modest 
conception of America’s role in the world” (p. 204). From a grand strategic point of view, 
the US needs to “retrench” in order to “restore solvency and domestic consensus” and 
“make more room for rising powers” if it wants to “get right the management of the global 
turn” (p. 203). 
According to Kupchan, the sources of Western weakness are less structural and more about 
internal politics. Dealing with bipartisan politics and opting for “selective engagement” 
abroad is a way to accommodate the “rising rest” (pp. 180−81). He finally lays out the 
principles for managing the global turn. Kupchan advocates for establishing the principles 
of international order which will suit the interests of the United States while striving for a 
“more inclusive global order” and suggesting a “more pluralist approach to legitimacy”. He 
also proposes to manage the rise of China, tame globalization and restore US leadership. 
Here I underline his advice to the United States to facilitate regional devolution, which 
shall leave room for states to pursue political action in a regional setting through various 
forms of regionalism (p. 197).  
Toward a Theory of One World and Security Community
As opposed to Kupchan’s perspective, Kishore Mahbubani, the dean of the Lee Kuan Yew 
School of Public Policy in Singapore, sees the global turn as a big opportunity for the 
world. While starting off the same mark as Kupchan, claiming that the world has changed 
significantly under the influence of economic and technological globalization, he seeks to 
explain this change by using a single idea – “the great convergence”. Mahbubani seems to 
follow a Liberal tradition in IR, claiming that we live in a global civilization which makes 
an impact on “human condition” due to globalization and interdependence (p. 2). The 
author seeks to understand where the world is headed, and he wants to develop a theory 
which can serve that goal. One of the key goals of the book is to “spark a new discourse 
about the global condition”, which is the requirement for advancing global convergence. 
The main argument of his book is that the closeness of the global civilization is achieved 
through forces of globalization and mediated by transnational elites educated in the West. 
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The book is organized into seven chapters. Chapter 1 lays down the context for claims 
about the “new global civilization” and provides empirical data which show the trend of 
rising human security, prosperity and education, as well as emerging global norms at the 
outset of the 21st century. Chapter 2 aims to bridge the gap between the global theory and 
practice, because lack of such theory “prevents an effective response” to global challenges 
(p. 51) – whereas the leaders “are making decisions on the basis of some defunct political 
ideas” (p. 64). In Chapters 3 and 4, the author tackles the issue of multilateralism and the 
United Nations system as the place for mitigating the risks to global public goods. He lists 
seven global contradictions (global interests vs. national interests, the West versus the 
Rest, US-China relations, expanding China versus a shrinking world, Islam vs. the West, 
global environment vs. global consumers, and governments vs. NGOs). These two chapters 
bring forth the idea that the leaders are those who fail to understand those contradictions, 
and that it is up to the states to make significant compromises in their understanding of 
national and global interests. Chapters 5 and 6 deal with the main geopolitical challenges 
in the East and discuss the miraculous transformation of Southeast Asia toward a security 
community under the “power of convergence”. Mahbubani, obviously inspired by the 
works of Amitav Acharya, singles out this region as a success story of a geopolitical hotspot 
which became a security community and a source of Asian-bred regionalism. Chapter 6 
addresses the need for the West to show to other regions of the world that it is ready to 
cooperate with equal partners and to leave the position of “moral high ground”. Chapter 
7 argues for the need of effective global governance reform of the United Nations system. 
Particular attention is paid to the reform of the Security Council which needs to provide 
more room for rising regional powers and small states. In the conclusion, Mahbubani 
calls for “principles of global ethics” which can serve as the Kantian categorical imperative 
that would drive societies toward greater solidarity in this shrinking, converging world.
Relevance for the Study of Regional Security
How do these two books contrinute to the discussion on regional security in the 21st 
century? Kupchan’s argument, that the world in this century will belong to no one, 
leaves us with the idea of various regional hegemonies. The scholars mostly agree that 
China’s economic power and its ambitions will consolidate its hegemony in East Asia, 
which renders the East Asian Regional Security Complex probably the most important 
in this century. In his prognosis, Kupchan expects the United States to share the burden 
with other emerging powers in making a peaceful transition to a new system. On the 
other hand, Mahbubani is more optimistic in believing that the forces of globalization 
have increased the likelihood of security community building in Asia. This elite-driven 
security community building would be possible to replicate in other parts of the world 
(cf. Kavalski 2007). Similarly to Acharya, Mahbubani points to the example of ASEAN 
as a success story in security community building and a distinct form of regionalism in 
Asia. The second issue for both authors is the state. They agree that the Westphalian 
concept of statehood is somewhat outdated, and that there will be different versions of 
modernity. For Kupchan, the West needs to recognize that states can attain legitimacy in 
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a variety of ways, and beyond liberal democracy. Also, contrary to Mahbubani, Kupchan 
is rather skeptical of the logic of democratic peace. For him, deepening economic ties are 
not a source but a consequence of peace (p. 187). Like Mahbubani, Kupchan points to the 
value of regionalism in resolving conflicts and fostering cooperation, because regional 
countries enjoy specific legitimacy. 
In sum, the study of regional security can benefit not only from these two books, but 
also from the literature on power transitions and international order more generally. Of 
particular importance here are the views from those scholars who do not belong to the 
Western IR tradition, which makes Mahbubani’s work particularly interesting. Although 
his book is more concerned with the global level of analysis, transnational elites and 
multilateralism, the point that he makes about Asian regionalism, building a security 
community in ASEAN region and the role of small states in the conception of One World 
feeds back on RSCT as analytical framework. That is particularly true in the part dealing 
with the patterns of amity and enmity and how they develop under the influence of 
structural and behavioral factors. On the other hand, Kupchan’s work, with its emphasis 
on the demise of global US hegemony and its focus on specific regional dynamics of the 
competing models (autocrats, theocrats, populists, strongmen, and democracies with 
attitude) is of relevance for the study of intra-regional security interactions, as well as 
for the role of external penetration in security complexes. While Mahbubani adopts 
post-Western and post-Westphalian view of a system dominated by one global idea, 
Kupchan endorses US and Western-centric perspective of the world of regions. These 
two argumentations are both complimentary and different, and greatly beneficial for our 
understanding of possible scenarios for the future of world politics.
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